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Abstract 
 
 
This paper is an exploration in the semantics and pragmatics of linguistic feedback, 
i.e., linguistic mechanisms which enable the participants in spoken interaction to 
exchange information about basic communicative functions, such as contact, 
perception, understanding, and attitudinal reactions to the communicated content. 
Special attention is given to the type of reaction conveyed by feedback utterances, 
the communicative status of the information conveyed (i. e., the level of awareness 
and intentionality of the communicating sender), and the context sensitivity of 
feedback expressions. With regard to context sensitivity, which is one of the most 
characteristic features of feedback expressions, the discussion focuses on the way in 
which the type of speech act (mood), the factual polarity and the information status 
of the preceding utterance influence the interpretation of feedback utterances. The 
different content dimensions are exemplified by data from recorded dialogues and by 
data given through linguistic intuition. Finally, two different ways of formalizing the 
analysis are examined, one using attribute-value matrices and one based on the 
theory of situation semantics. 
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1. Purpose 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present a sketch of a semantic/pragmatic account of 
linguistic feedback mechanisms in spoken interaction. After an initial account and 
exemplification of the relevant semantic/pragmatic features has been made, two 
attempts at formalizing these are presented and discussed. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2. 1.  Analytic components of communication 
 
Direct human face-to-face communication can be seen as the product of analytically 
separable, interdependent functional subsystems. 
 
In Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén (1990), it was suggested that, at least for some 
purposes, the following three overriding functions might be fruitful to consider for 
speech production and speech perception. 
 
 
(i) Speech management functions, i.e., the linguistic processes and mechanisms 
whereby a speaker manages his or her own linguistic contributions to a 
communicative interaction, involving phenomena that have sometimes been 
described as “planning”, “editing”, “(self)repair” etc. 
 
(ii) Interactive functions, i.e., linguistic processes and mechanisms whereby the 
speakers manage the flow of interaction. (Feedback mechanisms, the topic of 
this paper, is an example of an interactive subsystem.) 
 
 (iii) Focussed or main   message functions, i.e., linguistic processes and 
mechanisms whereby speakers manage to communicate information which is 
not immediately connected with management of their own speech or the 
interaction at hand. Focussed or main message functions, thus, include most 
of what is commonly described in grammatical theory and can be 
operationally defined as that which is contained in an utterance when those 
parts that are devoted to speech management or interactive functions have 
been substracted. 
 
Speech management, interactive functions and focussed/main message functions can 
further be analytically subdivided into subsystems and subsystems of subsystems, 
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characterized by different functions. Interaction functions can, for example, be 
subdivided into mechanisms for: 
 
(i) sequencing (of activities and subactivities, communicative acts and/or topics) 
 
(ii) turntaking 
 
(iii) giving and eliciting feedback. 
 
The literature on conversation analysis and discourse analysis (see e.g. Levinson 
1985 or Brown and Yule 1983) contains much discussion of the former two types of 
mechanisms, whereas there has been less discussion of feedback (cf. Allwood 1988a, 
1988b). This paper is intended as a contribution to the further exploration of 
linguistic feedback mechanisms, especially with regard to the semantic/pragmatic 
functions of such mechanisms.1 
 
 
2.2. Linguistic feedback: basic functions 
 
The term feedback originates in cybernetics (Wiener 1948), where it is used to 
denote processes by which a control unit gets information about the effects and 
consequences of its actions. 
 
Here we are concerned with linguistic (interindividual) feedback (Allwood 1979, 
1988a, 1988b, 1988c), i.e., linguistic mechanisms which enable the participants of a 
conversation to exchange information about four basic communicative functions, 
which are essential in human direct face-to-face communication. These functions 
are: 
 
(i) contact (i.e., whether the interlocutor is willing and able to continue the 
interaction) 
 
(ii) perception (i.e., whether the interlocutor is willing and able to perceive the 
message) 
 
(iii) understanding (i.e., whether the interlocutor is willing and able to understand 
the message) 
 
                                                 
1
  As can he seen. we are here making no attempt to distinguish semantics from pragmatics. This is 
so because we believe that such a distinction runs into serious practical and theoretical difficulties 
(cf. Allwood 1981). 
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(iv) attitudinal reactions (i.e. whether the interlocutor is willing and able to react 
and (adequately) respond to the message, specifically whether he/she accepts 
or rejects it). 
 
These four basic functions of linguistic feedback arise from four basic requirements 
of human communication. First, communication requires that at least two agents are 
willing and able to communicate. Second, communication requires that the receiving 
agent is willing and able to perceive the behavioral or other means whereby the 
sending agent is displaying or signalling information. Third, communication requires 
that the receiving agent is willing and able to understand the content that the sender 
is displaying or signalling. It is also often helpful if the receiver can perceive and 
understand various types of indicated information.2 Finally, communication requires 
that the receiving agent is willing and able to react attitudinally and behaviorally to 
various aspects of the content that the sender is displaying or signalling. Again, it is 
sometimes beneficial for communication, if the receiver also reacts to indicated 
information. Certain conventional features of the displayed or signalled content here 
seem particularly important for the interpretation of the content of feedback 
expressions. Among these are polarity (positive or negative) and mood 
(conventionally signalled evocative intention; cf. Allwood 1978). 
 
Every language appears to have conventionalized means (verbal and prosodic means 
as well as body movements) for giving and eliciting information about the four basic 
communicative functions. Linguistic feedback mechanisms on a primary level 
usually involve very short morphemes (yes, no, m), or basic mechanisms such as 
repetition, simple body movements (head nods, head shakes) in combination, on a 
secondary level, with fairly simple phonological, morphological and syntactic 
operations for modifying and expanding the primary feedback expressions. 
 
Earlier studies that have discussed feedback and related phenomena include Allwood 
(1976, 1979, 1988a, 1988b), Anward (1986), Clark & Schaefer (1989), Ehlich 
(1986), Fries (1952), Hellberg (1985), Heritage (1984), James (1972), Nivre (1991), 
Schegloff (1982), Severinson-Eklundh (1986), Sigurd (1984), Yngve (1970). 
Allwood (1988b) gives a taxonomy for the structure of linguistic feedback and, in 
particular, describes the Swedish system. In the present paper, we want to focus on 
the content features of linguistic feedback. 
 
                                                 
2
  For the distinction between indicated, displayed and signalled information, see section 3.3 below. 
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3. Content features of feedback 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Although simple feedback words, like yes, no and m, are among the most frequent in 
spoken language, a proper analysis of their semantic/pragmatic content seems to be 
fairly complex and involve several different dimensions. One striking feature is, for 
example, that these words involve a high degree of context dependence. 
 
Below, we will first discuss four of these dimensions and exemplify them by data 
from recorded dialogues and by data given through linguistic intuition. The examples 
from recorded dialogues are all in Swedish (with English translations). In addition to 
this, Swedish is used to exemplify distinctions which can not be found in English. 
The four dimensions we will discuss are: 
 
(i) Type of reaction to preceding communicative act 
 
(ii) Communicative status 
 
(iii) Context sensitivity to preceding communicative act, with regard to: 
 A. Type of speech act (mood) 
 B. Factual polarity 
 C. Information status 
 
(iv) Evocative function. 
 
3.2.  Type of reaction to the preceding communicative act 
 
The raison d'être of linguistic feedback mechanisms is the need to elicit and give 
information about the basic communicative functions, i.e., continued contact, 
perception, understanding and emotional/attitudinal reaction, in a sufficiently 
unobtrusive way to allow communication to serve as an instrument for pursuing 
various human activities. The linguistic feedback system is, in this way, an essential 
instrument for successful communication of any type. Especially, it is an essential 
instrument for the incrementality of communication, i.e., the step by step build up of 
consensual joint understanding and attitudes. Feedback mechanisms are, thus, a 
means for communication which in its turn is a means for pursuing a variety of other 
human activities. 
 
In our analysis of the content of feedback we are assuming that what we have called 
the basic functions also define four basic dimensions in the reactions that 
interlocutors have to each other's contributions in conversation. Feedback utterances, 
thus, give information about one or several of the following types of reaction: 
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(i) contact - willingness and ability to continue interaction 
(ii) perception -  willingness and ability to perceive expression  
  and message 
(iii) understanding -  willingness and ability to understand expression  
  and message 
(iv) (other) attitudinal reactions -  willingness and ability to give other attitudinal  
  reactions to expression, message,or interlocutor. 
 
Category (iv) has the word other in brackets, since contact, perception, and 
understanding also involve attitudes, albeit of a very fundamental cognitive and 
volitional sort. Category (iv), which we will mostly just refer to as attitudinal 
reactions without other, is supposed to cover other attitudes such as acceptance, 
non-acceptance, belief, disbelief, surprise, boredom, disappointment, enthusiasm, 
etc. When it comes to the words yes and no and their synonyms, we believe that the 
attitudes acceptance and nonacceptance are in focus and form a basis which can be 
modified by added attitudinal reactions. We can, thus, accept with regret or with 
enthusiasm by uttering the word yes with different types of prosody. In general, we 
can say that feedback words differ from each other mainly with regard to what 
attitude they signal, e.g., yes - acceptance, no - non-acceptance, great - appreciation/ 
enthusiasm, etc. 
 
In example (1) below, ja (yes) has the functions of conveying continued contact, 
perception and understanding as well as the attitudinal reaction acceptance. 
 
(1) A:  men efter tre år va de ju3 en härlig mylla 
  (but after three years you-know it was a lovely mould) 
 
 B:  ja 
 (yes) 
 
We can compare this to example (2), where B's weaker feedback utterance mm has 
the same content with respect to contact, perception and understanding, but does not 
necessarily convey the attitudinal reaction of acceptance of the veridicality of A's 
statement. 
 
                                                 
3
  The Swedish word ju appears in some of the examples in this paper. Ju has no exact translation 
into English. It has the function of making what is stated appear as mutually known information. 
This might depending on context variously he rendered as "you know" or "we know".  For reasons 
of idiomaticity. we have chosen to use the hyphenated expression you-know. in our translations 
although this is not always a good equivalent. It should also he observed that ju is less salient and 
weaker than you-know. 
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(2)  A: ...ja kan få såna //  kontakter …kontakter mä universum jaa 
  (yes I can get such // contacts … contacts with the universe yes) 
 
 B: MM 
 (mm) 
 
One might, however, claim that mm still signals acceptance in the weaker sense of 
accepting to continue, accepting the information in the preceding utterance as 
perceived and understood and possibly also of accepting to take a stand on this 
information. 
 
3.3. Commununicative status 
 
Like any other information communicated, feedback information concerning the 
basic communicative functions can be given on many levels of awareness and 
intentionality. This is so, whether the information is communicated by verbal or 
bodily means. Although levels of awareness and intentionality almost certainly are a 
matter of degree, we, in order to simplify matters somewhat, here distinguish three 
levels from the point of view of the communicating sender (cf. Allwood 1976): 
 
(i) Indicated information is information that the sender is not aware of, or 
intending to convey. This information is mostly communicated by virtue of 
the receiver's seeing it as an indexical (i.e., causal) sign. 
 
(ii) Displayed information is information that the sender is intending to “show” 
the receiver. The receiver does not, however, have to recognize this intention. 
Display of information can be achieved through any of the three main 
semiotic types of signs (indices, icons and symbols, cf. Peirce 1955). 
 
(iii) Signalled information is information that the sender is “showing” the receiver 
that he is displaying and, thus, intends the receiver to recognize as displayed. 
Signalling can also be achieved through any of the three main semiotic types 
of signs. In particular, however, we will regard ordinary linguistic expressions 
(verbal symbols) as being signals by convention. Thus, a linguistic expression 
like It's raining, when used conventionally, is intended to evoke the receiver's 
recognition not merely that “it's raining” but that he/she is “being shown that 
it's raining”. 
 
The fact that linguistic expressions by convention are taken to be signals, does not, 
however, imply that they are always actually used as signals. A symbol can also be 
used to indicate and/or display its conventionally signalled content or some other 
content. Compare the example discussed by Searle (1969), where an American 
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soldier, captured by the Italians in World War II, by quoting “kennst Du das Land, 
wo die Zitronen blühen” (do you know the land where the lemons bloom) intends to 
display to the Italians that he is German. 
 
In order to illustrate the application of the dimension of communicative status to 
linguistic feedback utterances we will consider the communicative status of some 
examples from the recorded dialogues. 
 
In examples (1) and (3) below, the communicative status of the feedback utterances 
produced by B is not quite the same. In both cases the preceding utterance (produced 
by A) is a declarative statement with positive polarity (i.e., it is not negated) and in 
both cases the feedback utterance signals the acceptance function by use of ja (yes), 
while it indicates continued contact as well as perception and understanding of the 
preceding utterance. In example (1), however, the simple ja (yes) can merely be said 
to indicate the attitude of belief, while in example (3), the more elaborated feedback 
utterance rather signals belief, expressed through the indicative mood of the sentence 
de e de ju (it is you know). 
 
(1) A: men efter tre år va de ju en härlig mylla 
 (but after three years you-know it was a lovely mould) 
 B: ja 
 (yes) 
 
 (3) A: de e ju väldit faalit me kärnkraft 
 (it is very dangerous you-know with nuclear power) 
 B: ja // de e de ju 
 (yes // it is you-know) 
 
3.4.  Context sensitivity with regard to the preceding  communicative act 
 
3.4.1. Introduction 
 
One way of analyzing the meaning of linguistic feedback expressions and 
mechanisms is to say that they are characterized by a very abstract conventional type 
content in combination with high degree of context sensitivity. For example, the 
conventional type content of the three expressions yes, no, m, and ok can perhaps be 
characterized in the following way: 
yes -  acceptance 
no - rejection 
n - confirmation 
ok - agreement 
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The conventional occurrence content of the three expressions is, however, always 
also a function of prosody and context. The function of prosody is mainly to 
modulate attitudinal information. In some cases (cf. example 5 below), this can 
affect the presupposed truth of the preceding utterance. Prosody will, however, not 
be treated in any detail in this paper. As for context, table 1 below demonstrates the 
influence of mood and polarity of the preceding utterance. 
 
Table 1. Functions of yes, no, m, and ok in relation to the mood and polarity of  
 the preceding utterance. 
 
Preceding 
utterance 
Listener's 
response 
  
 
 
 
 yes no m ok 
Pos statement 
It's raining 
Acceptance of 
statement (Indicated 
belief) 
Rejection of 
statement 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated acceptance 
of statement) 
Agreement 
(Acceptance of 
what has been said 
as a point of 
departure, more or 
less stipulatively) 
Neg statement: 
It isn't raining 
Ambiguous between 
rejection of statement 
(yes it is) and 
acceptance of 
statement (yes you 
are right) 
Acceptance of 
statement 
(Indicated belief) 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
Agreement 
(Acceptance of 
what has been aid 
as a point of 
departure …) 
Pos yes-no 
question: 
Is it raining? 
Commitment to 
positive fact 
Commitment to 
negative fact 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated 
commitment to 
positive fact) 
Agreement 
(Acceptance of 
implicit suggestion) 
Neg yes-no 
question: 
Isn't it raining? 
Commitment to 
positive fact 
Commitment to 
negative fact 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated 
commitment to 
positive fact)) 
Agreement 
(Acceptance of 
implicit suggestion) 
Pos request: 
Open the door! 
Acceptance of 
request 
Refusal of request Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated acceptance 
of request) 
Agreement 
Neg request: 
Don't open the 
door! 
Unclear Acceptance of 
request 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated acceptance 
of request) 
Agreement   
Pos offer: 
Would you like 
some tea? 
Acceptance of offer Rejection of 
offer 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated acceptance 
of offer) 
Agreement  
(Indicated 
acceptance on the 
grounds of what has 
been said) 
Neg offer 
Wouldn't you 
like some tea? 
Acceptance of offer Rejection of 
offer 
Confirmation of 
understanding 
(Indicated acceptance 
of offer) 
Agreement  
(Indicated 
acceptance on the 
grounds of what has 
been said) 
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We can see how context can change the occurrence content both with regard to 
attitudinal reaction (from acceptance to non-acceptance) and with regard to 
attitudinal object (e. g., from statement to offer). The table is somewhat unnatural in 
that simple feedback expressions without pronominal indications of the objects of 
acceptance and nonacceptance (yes it is, no it isn't) have been used. In the case of 
yes, this leads to ambiguity after a negative statement (ambiguous between 
acceptance of a negative statement and acceptance of the positive counterpart of the 
negative statement = rejection) and unclarity after a negative request (yes I will(?), 
yes I won't(?)). 
 
We seem to have a sort of semantic field constituted by terms like yes, no, m, and ok 
supported by attitudinal dimensions of meaning like agreement, confirmation, 
acceptance and commitment. Each term is primarily focussed towards one or several 
of these dimensions, but can, depending on context, simultaneously indicate or 
display other compatible dimensions or even, with a change of focus, signal other 
dimensions. 
 
The latter might happen, for example, in language acquisition, when a language 
learner who is yet not very proficient in the language he/she is learning uses the 
vagueness of the notion of acceptance connected with the word yes in order to signal 
acceptance of continued communication rather than acceptance of perceived and 
understood content. What is really being signalled (displayed or indicated, as the 
case may be) is willingness or agreement to continue communication rather than the 
more stereotypical fullbodied notion of accepting the evocative intention of the 
preceding utterance (communicative act). If the receiver of the yes is not fully 
informed about the learner's nonproficiency, there is a clear risk that what the learner 
is signalling (displaying, indicating) will be misunderstood. 
 
Just like deictic expressions (I, you, here, there, now, then, etc.), feedback 
expressions are, thus, highly dependent on context for a precise determination of 
their meaning. However, just as is the case with deictic terms, this dependence is not 
random, but in fact triggered by specific contextual parameters. As can be seen from 
the discussion and examples above and further from the examples to be discussed 
below, among the most important of these parameters are various features of the 
immediately preceding communicative act: 
 
(i) Type of speech act (mood) 
(ii) Factual polarity 
(hi) Information status. 
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3.4.2. Type of speech act (mood) 
 
Table 2, which is extracted from table 1, illustrates the status of yes in different 
contexts. More precisely, we can see that the object of acceptance is determined by 
mood and speech act status. In the examples, we are making the assumption that 
mood and speech act status are in harmony. When mood and speech act status 
differ, increased degrees of freedom as to object of acceptance are introduced and 
context seems to determine which is chosen. 
 
Table 2. Effects of speech act status (mood) on feedback. 
 
Preceding utterance Listener's reply Function 
It's raining yes Acceptance of statement 
It's raining yes Commitment to positive fact 
Open the door! yes Acceptance of request 
Would you like some 
coffee? 
yes Acceptance of offer 
 
 
We also see that the speech act status of the preceding communicative act can trigger 
a change in the attitude signalled. A yes-no question can, at least in some cases, be 
analyzed as a request for a commitment on the part of an interlocutor as to the 
veridicality of some statement. A reply using yes or no will therefore indicate a 
positive or negative commitment to an indicated fact and not merely acceptance of 
this fact. 
 
If we contrast examples (1) and (4), we see the partially different functions of ja/jaa 
(yes) after a statement (example 1), where it conveys acceptance of the statement and 
after a question (example 4), where it conveys commitment to a positive fact. 
 
(1) A: men efter tre år va de ju en härlig mylla 
  (but after three years you-know it was a lovely mould) 
 B:  ja 
  (yes) 
 
(4) A: e ni klara då 
  (are you finished then) 
 B: jaa 
 (yes) 
 
The vowel reduplication in jaa is one of the means whereby a speaker can show 
increased commitment. 
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Further, if we take the meaning of yes and no to be acceptance and non-acceptance 
(rejection), it might be tempting to assume that they, when following a statement, 
like in the case above, always directly indicate acceptance or non-acceptance of this 
statement. This is, however, an oversimplification as is shown by the example below. 
 
 (5) A: it's raining 
 B: oh no 
 
Here, oh no, if pronounced in a short, matter of fact way, can indicate denial of the 
statement. But consider instead the possibilities of pronouncing oh no with a 
disappointed or surprised intonation. In such cases, B would presuppose the truth of 
A's statement in order to signal his emotional non-acceptance of something he, all 
the same, believes to be true. 
 
The object of acceptance or non-acceptance contextually signalled by yes and no, 
thus, does not merely depend on the status of the preceding communicative act but 
also on what type of attitudinal reaction the feedback utterance signals. Attitudes 
such as disappointment or surprise are factive and presuppose some fact towards 
which they are directed. This presupposition seems to be upheld in the case above 
and the nonacceptance instead to be used as an underpinning of the unpleasantness 
or unexpectedness signalled by the word oh in conjunction with the prosodic 
expression of disappointment or surprise. 
 
3.4.3. Factual polarity 
 
If we look at examples (6) and (7) below, we can see how the factual polarity of the 
preceding communicative act affects the function of the feedback utterance Consider 
the use of nä/nej (no) in examples (6) and (7) below. 
 
 (6) A: de kan ju inte va för fiskarnas skull va 
  (it couldn't be for the sake of the fish you-know) 
 
 B: nä 
  (no) 
 
In example (6) the preceding statement has negative polarity and the function of the 
negative feedback utterance is acceptance. In example (7), on the other hand, the 
preceding statement has positive polarity and the function of the negative feedback is 
nonacceptance. 
 
(7) A: så går naturen under me tekniken 
 (like that nature perishes with technology) 
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 B: NEJ // de växer upp annat då vet du 
  (no //  other things grow up you know) 
 
Table 3, which is also extracted from table 1, illustrates the role of the factual 
polarity of the preceding utterance. As we can see, the polarity of the preceding 
utterance affects the attitude expressed by a yes or a no. If a statement preceding a 
yes is positive, the yes signals acceptance of the statement. If the statement, however, 
is negative, the yes can signal objection and rejection of the proposed negative 
statement. Normally, however, this function has to be supported by the positive 
pronominal reformulation it is. Likewise a no following a positive statement signals 
rejection of the statement, but following a negative statement it signals acceptance. 
The polarity of the preceding utterance, thus, seems to have a particularly drastic 
effect on the attitude signalled by a yes or a no. 
 
 
Table 3. Effects of the factual polarity of the preceding utterance on feedback. 
 
 
Preceding 
utterance 
Listener's 
response 
 
 yes (it is) no (it isn't) 
Pos statement 
It's raining 
Acceptance of 
statement (Indicated 
belief) 
Rejection of statement 
Neg statement: 
It isn't raining 
Rejection of 
statement  
Acceptance of 
statement (Indicated 
belief) 
Pos yes-no question: 
Is it raining? 
Commitment to 
positive fact 
Commitment to 
negative fact 
Neg yes-no question: 
Isn't it raining? 
Commitment to 
positive fact 
Commitment to 
negative fact 
 yes (I will) no (I won't) 
Pos request: 
Open the door! 
Acceptance of 
request 
Refusal of request 
Neg request: 
Don't open the door! 
Rejection of request 
(Defiance) 
Acceptance of request 
 yes (I would) no (I wouldn't) 
Pos offer: 
Would you like some 
tea? 
Acceptance of offer Rejection of offer 
(Declination) 
Neg offer 
Wouldn't you like 
some tea? 
Acceptance of offer Rejection of offer 
(Declination) 
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If we look somewhat more closely at table 3, we see that statements and requests 
seem to pattern one way and yes-no questions and offers a slightly different way 
with regard to the effect of their polarity on the content of yes and no. In the case of 
statements and requests, positive polarity results in acceptance (yes) and rejection 
(no), while negative polarity results in the converse rejection (yes) and acceptance 
(no). What seems to be accepted or rejected in the case of requests is the task of 
carrying out the request, while following statements, acceptance (yes and no) 
ambiguously can concern what might be termed provisional acceptance or it might 
concern a more fullbodied acceptance and integration into one's own system of 
beliefs. Rejection following statements seems in the case of both yes and no to signal 
commitment to fact with a polarity opposite the one indicated by the statement. 
 
In the case of preceding yes-no questions and offers (which in the examples given 
here also have the form of yes-no questions), change of polarity does not seem to 
have the same effect, so that yes signals commitment to positive fact and no signals 
commitment to negative fact, regardless of the polarity of the preceding utterance. 
 
In order to maintain the same analysis for all four contexts we could say that the yes, 
where it follows a negative yes-no question or offer (since negation to be relevant 
seems to presuppose a positive expected state of affairs which is denied) signals 
acceptance of this expected positive state of affairs. A no would signal rejection of 
this expected positive state of affairs. 
 
Another alternative to maintain the same analysis for all four contexts would be to 
claim that yes always involves commitment to positive fact and no commitment to 
negative fact. This analysis would, in fact, also work for yes and no following 
statements and requests, where, for example, a yes signalling commitment to positive 
fact following a negative statement would indicate objection or rejection of the claim 
made and when following a positive statement would indicate acceptance or 
agreement. Even if the analysis of yes and no as signalling commitment to positive 
and negative facts, respectively, perhaps seems somewhat simpler than the 
acceptance/non-acceptance analysis, it runs into problems with the case discussed in 
example (5), i. e. where no is preceded by oh and pronounced with an intonation 
conveying disappointment. Such a response seems to presuppose the correctness of 
the speaker's claim, but signal the listener's emotive, conative non-acceptance. 
 
Whichever analysis is chosen, it is, however, clear, that the attitude expressed by a 
yes or a no requires consideration of the polarity of the immediately preceding 
utterance in order to be determined. 
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In some languages, such as Swedish and German, the analysis just proposed for yes 
and no in English would have to be made somewhat more complicated in order to 
accommodate the fact that these languages have a special morpheme jo (Swedish) 
and doch (German) which is used instead of yes in all the cases following an 
utterance with negative polarity. So for Swedish and German one could therefore 
suggest that the meaning of ja (the same word in both languages) is to accept to carry 
out what the evocative function of a preceding positive utterance signals. In the case 
of statements, yes-no questions, and yes-no offers, the ja furthermore often “delivers 
the goods”, i.e., provides a commitment to one of the indicated alternatives. In the 
case of requests, this is usually not possible since mostly nonverbal action going 
beyond a simple yes is required to “deliver the goods”. 
 
The function of jo and doch would, when following an utterance with negative 
polarity, instead be to assert commitment to a positive corresponding state of affairs 
opposite to that indicated by the preceding utterance. The Swedish and German 
distinction between ja - jo and ja - doch would thus separate acceptance of a positive 
state of affairs from commitment to a positive state of affairs as a reaction to an 
utterance where this state of affairs has been given negative polarity. In English, yes 
is instead polysemic  with regard to these functions. Other languages, such as 
Russian, offer a further modification of the analysis. The acceptance function of da 
(yes) has been extended so that not only positive facts can be accepted, but also 
negative facts. Consider the following example. 
 
(8) A:  nie idjot dozhd 
 B: da 
 
B's utterance in the Russian example (8) signals acceptance of the fact that it is not 
raining. Negative questions, requests and offers seem to function similarly, so that da 
can be used to signal acceptance of a negative state of affairs. In English, the word 
mm can be used in a similar way, the difference being that mm indicates rather than 
signals acceptance. 
 
3.4.4. Information status 
 
A third feature of an utterance preceding a yes or a no that seems important both for 
the actual morphological and phonological realization of yes or no and for their 
interpretation is the information status that the utterance has for the listener, i.e., for 
the person giving the feedback. Compare examples (9), (10), and (11). 
 
(9) A: det regnar 
  (it's raining) 
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 B: ja det gör det ja 
  (yes it does it yes) 
 
(10)  A: det regnar inte 
  (it's not raining) 
 
 B: nä det gör det inte nä 
  (no it does it not no) 
 
 A: det regnar 
  (it's raining) 
 
 B: *nä det gör det inte nä 
  (no it does it not no) 
 
In example (9), the “sandwich” positioning of the ja before and after the pronominal 
reassertion of the preceding statement serves to signal that the listener has been 
reminded of something he/she already knew. The corresponding “sandwich” 
construction with no can therefore be used after a negated statement, as in example 
(10), only when it signals that B is reminded of a negative fact that he accepts as 
true. It cannot be used in order to object to a positive statement, as in example (11). 
 
If, in example (9), B had responded by ja ja, which could be regarded as an 
abbreviated version of ja det gör det ja, the signalled meaning would have been 
something like yes, I know, without the indication of having been reminded. If B had 
responded by jaså (oh (really)), this would instead have signalled that the fact 
mentioned by A was new to B, thus not something he was reminded of or already 
knew. In fact, this feature of jaså (oh) can be ironically exploited in Swedish by 
speakers who say jaså in order to indicate to their interlocutor that what they are 
hearing is perhaps not so new and interesting as their interlocutor would like to 
imagine. 
 
Another operation on information status can be achieved by the use of jaha (oh) 
which in example (9) could have been used to signal that B accepts that A says det 
regnar as a fact, which is ambiguous between taking A's uttering something as a fact 
and taking the state of affairs indicated by A as a fact. This ambiguity is brought out 
in examples such as jaha, det är vad du säger (oh, that's what you say), jaha det är 
vad du tror (oh, that's what you think) or jaha, då får vi ta med oss paraply (oh, then 
we have to take an umbrella). 
 
As we have seen, there are various means for making a feedback utterance indicate, 
display or signal the information status of the preceding utterance in relation to the 
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person who gives feedback. In example (12) below, the use of the negative 
morpheme nä (no), as a reaction to a preceding positive statement, as well as the 
lengthening of the morpheme nä (no) by the added vowel -e, makes the utterance 
display an attitude of surprise and thereby indicate that the information status of the 
preceding utterance is new rather than given or known. In particular, as already 
discussed in section 3.4.2., B is not denying the veridicality of A's statement. 
 
(12)  A: så ja har tomatlådor där å ja brukar få ett par hundra tomater 
  (so 1 have tomato boxes there and I usually get hundreds of 
  tomatoes) 
 B: näe 
  (no) 
 
Another example, where the information of the preceding communicative act is 
perceived as new, by virtue of the feedback utterance is example (13) below. 
 
3.5. Evocative function 
 
Feedback utterances conveying that the listener (B in our examples) is surprised and 
that the information in the preceding utterance is new to him/her, often also have an 
evocative function, i.e., they place an obligation on the current speaker (A) to react, 
in his turn, and give feedback to B's feedback. Thus, B's jasså, in example (13), 
displays surprise which leads A to reaffirm. 
 
 (13)  A: å karamellpapprena dom kommer i i // i den där papperskorgen sen 
  (and the candy papers they get into into // into that waste paper  
  basket then) 
 
 B: jasså 
  (really) 
 
 A: jaa 
  (yes) 
 
 B: de va ovanlit 
 (that's unusual) 
 
The word jasså (really) displays surprise and indicates that the preceding utterance 
contains new information. An additional rising intonation can make this function 
even stronger. As we can see, A responds with a feedback utterance jaa (yes), where 
the added -a gives the utterance emphasis, i.e., A reaffirms his own preceding 
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utterance. B then continues de va ovanlit (that's unusual), which displays her 
continued attitude of surprise. 
 
In a somewhat wider sense of evocative, of course, every utterance containing only a 
single feedback word could be said to evoke the continuation of the conversation. 
Consideration of the evocative function of feedback, thus, connects it to the basic 
function we have above referred to as ability and willingness to continue a 
communicative interaction. By uttering a feedback word a speaker simultaneously 
indicates willingness and ability to continue and willingness and ability to let the 
other speaker continue. 
 
 
4. Formalizing content features of feedback 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In this section, we want to explore the possibility of formalizing the analysis of 
content features presented in section 3. In doing this we will develop two different 
kinds of formalization, one using attribute-value matrices and the other based on the 
theory of situation semantics. 
 
4.1.1.  Attribute-value structures 
 
The first kind of formalization simply consists in using attribute-value matrices to 
represent bundles of content features associated with linguistic expressions. Besides 
offering a compact and yet perspicuous notation, the use of attribute-value matrices 
(or feature structures, as they are sometimes called) potentially gives us a 
unification-based formalism,4  which may be useful if you want to describe how the 
occurrence content of a particular feedback utterance is constructed by combining a 
type content with features of the context. (This is a problem that we will not really 
pursue in this paper, however.) 
 
4.1.2. Situation semantics 
 
The second attempt at formalization is couched in the framework of situation 
semantics (Barwise & Perry 1983, 1985; Barwise 1989). Within that theory, the 
occurrence content P of a linguistic utterance is regarded as a function of two 
parameters: the expression (type) S which is used, and the embedding circumstances 
                                                 
4
  For an introduction to unification-based formalisms and their use in syntax and semantics. see 
Shieber 1986, Pollard & Sag 1987, Johnson 1988. 
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(or context) c in which S occurs. This is expressed in the following semantical 
“equation” (cf. Barwise 1986b): 
 
 (14)  C(S, c) = P 
 
The occurrence content of an expression S in a context c (as well as the content of 
any other information-carrying event) is generally taken to be the information that 
there exists a (real) situation of a certain type (i. e. that a certain type of situation is 
realized). The content is therefore modelled in situation semantics with a situation 
type (cf. Barwise 1986a, Israel & Perry 1988). A situation type T is defined by a 
(possibly parametric) infon (or state of affairs) i, which is called the conditioning 
infon of T. A particular situation s is of type T if and only if it supports i (or an 
instance of i, if i is parametric), i.e. if and only if i is a fact in s. A situation-type T 
with conditioning infon i is represented as in (15), where s is a situation variable and 
the whole expression is read as “the type of situation s where i holds”. 
 
(15)  [ s | i ] 
 
For example, if an utterance of the sentence It is raining in a certain context c has the 
content “it is raining at a certain spatiotemporal location l" (say, the utterance 
location), then we may express this as follows: 
 
(16)  C(It is raining, c) = [ s ] <<at l; raining; l>> ] 
 
The picture sketched so far is oversimplified in (at least) one important respect. In 
reality, the content of a linguistic utterance is not a function of two but of three 
parameters. In addition to the expression used and the embedding circumstances, we 
have to consider the set of constraints (law-like regularities such as linguistic 
conventions) with respect to which the utterance interpreted, as the examples in (17) 
make clear: 
 
(17)  a.  C(Swedish, /næ/, c) = “no” 
 
 b . C(Greek, /næ/, c) = “yes” 
 
Since we will only be concerned with one language (Swedish) in the formalized 
examples below, we will generally suppress the constraint parameter in the 
representations and continue to represent the content of linguistic utterances as a 
function of only two parameters: expression and content. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that the content we attribute to particular utterances is always 
dependent on a particular set of constraints (especially linguistic conventions). 
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4.2.  Type of reaction to the preceding communicative act 
 
Information about the basic communicative functions (contact, perception, 
understanding, attitudinal reactions) can be represented in attribute-value format 
using the four attributes CONTACT, PERCEPTION, UNDERSTANDING and ATTITUDE, 
where the attribute ATTITUDE, as noted above, can be read as short for OTHER 
ATTITUDE, since CONTACT, PERCEPTION and UNDERSTANDING also involve attitudes 
(cf. section 3.1). 
 
The first three will be treated here as binary features (with possible values + and -), 
although this is an oversimplification. The ATTITUDE feature, by contrast, takes as its 
value a complex feature structure containing information about the attitudinal 
reactions which are present in different cases. This complex feature structure thus 
contains a selection from a set of binary features ACCEPT, REJECT, BELIEF, 
AGREEMENT, SURPRISE, etc.5 
 
In sum, then, we need at least the following collection of features to represent type of 
reaction to preceding communicative act: 
 
 (18)  Feature Type of value 
 
CONTACT BOOLEAN 
PERCEPTION BOOLEAN 
UNDERSTANDING BOOLEAN 
ATTITUDE COMPLEX 
ACCEPT BOOLEAN 
REJECT BOOLEAN 
BELIEF BOOLEAN 
AGREEMENT  BOOLEAN 
SURPRISE BOOLEAN 
… 
 
The content of the feedback utterances ja and mm in examples (1) and (2) (repeated 
below for convenience) can now be (partially) represented as in (19) and (20), 
respectively. 
 
(1) A:  men efter tre år va de ju en härlig mylla 
  (but after three years you-know it was a lovely mould) 
                                                 
5
  Here it is even more of an oversimplification to use simple binary features, and for two reasons. 
First, the object of the attitudes may be different from one case to another, although it will be 
assumed here that the object is always some feature of the content of the preceding utterance. 
Second, the strength of the attitudes may vary, surprise, for example, may be expressed in different 
degrees, although it will he treated here as a simple yes-no matter. 
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 B:  ja 
 (yes) 
 
(19) [CONTACT +1 
 [PERCEPTION +] 
 [UNDERSTANDING +] 
 [ATTITUDE 
 [ACCEPT +]]  
 
 (2) A: ... ja kan få såna //  ääh kontakter....kontakter mä universum jaa 
   ( ... yes I can get such //  eeh contacts ... contacts with the  
   universe yes) 
 
 B:  mm 
  (mm) 
 
(20) [CONTACT  +] 
 [PERCEPTION  +] 
 [UNDERSTANDING +] 
 
If we turn to situation semantics, we must remember first that the content of a 
feedback utterance will be represented as a situation type (cf. section 4.1.2.). In most 
cases, the conditioning infon of this type will be a complex one, consisting of a 
conjunction of atomic infons (we will use the notation '& i1, ... ii' to denote the 
conjunction of the infons i1, ... ii). For example, the content of the feedback 
utterances in example (1) and (2) can be represented as in (21) and (22): 
 
(21) C(ja, c1)  = [s | &  <<at l1; willing-to-continue, B1; 1>>, 
   <<at l1; perceive, B1, u1; 1 >>,  
   <<at l1; understand, B1, u1, P1; 1>>,  
   <<at l1; accept, B1, P1; 1>> ] 
 
(22) C(mm, c2) = [s  | &  <<at l2; willing-to-continue, B2; 1 >>, 
    <<at l2; perceive, B2, u2; 1 >>, 
    <<at l2; understand, B2, u2, P2; 1 >> ] 
 
 
We see that the conditioning infons in both cases are conjunctions of (possible) facts 
about the speaker Bi and his willingness to continue, his perception of the preceding 
utterance ui, his understanding of the content Pi of the preceding utterance ui, and (in 
21 but not in 22) his acceptance of the communicated content Pi. 
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So far, we have not made any attempt to capture the influence of context in the 
interpretation of feedback utterances. For example, in (21) there is no indication of 
how the location l1, individual B1 utterance ul and content P1, (which are constituents 
of the conditioning infon) are picked out from the context (and the context itself is 
only represented by the symbol cl). We will return to this problem in section 4.4. 
below. 
 
4.3.  Communicative status 
 
Communicative status can be introduced into our attribute-value notation by means 
of three complex-valued attributes INDICATE, DISPLAY and SIGNAL, which take 
as their values feature structures representing the information which is indicated, 
displayed or signalled, respectively. Their use is illustrated in (23), which is a richer 
representation of the content of ja in example (1) than the one given in the preceding 
section, and (24), which represents the content of ja de e de ju in example (3), 
repeated below for convenience. 
 
(23) [INDICATE 
 [CONTACT +] 
 [PERCEPTION +] 
 [UNDERSTANDING +] 
 [ATTITUDE 
  [BELIEF +]]]  
 [SIGNAL 
  [ATTITUDE 
  [ACCEPT +]]]  
 
(3) A: de e ju väldit faalit me kärnkraft 
 (it is very dangerous you-know with nuclear power) 
 
 B: ja //  de e de ju 
 (yes //  it is you-know) 
 
 
(24) [INDICATE 
  [CONTACT +] 
  [PERCEPTION +1 
  [UNDERSTANDING +] 
 [SIGNAL 
  [ATTITUDE 
   [ACCEPT +] 
   [BELIEF +]]]  
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In situation semantics, the notion of communicative status can be captured in 
different ways. Here we approach the problem simply by dividing the content of an 
utterance into three parts, namely indicated content, displayed content and signalled 
content, which we will represent as C1(S, c), CD(S, c), and Cs(S, c), respectively. 
Thus, we assume that the following equation holds (for arbitrary expressionsS and 
contexts c): 
 
(25)  C(S, c = C1 (S, c + CD(S, c + CS(S, c) 
 
Given this assumption, we can characterize the contents of the feedback utterances in 
examples (1) and (3) as in (26) and (27): 
 
(26) C1(ja, c1)  = [s | &  <<at l1; willing-to-continue, B1; 1>>, 
   <<at l1; perceive, B1, u1; 1>>,  
   <<at l1; understand, B1, u1, P1, 1>>,  
   <<at l1; accept, B1, P1; 1>> ] 
 Cs(ja, c1)  = [s | &  <<at l1; accept, B1; P1; 1>> ] 
 
(27) C1 (ja de e de ju, , c3) = [s | &  <<at l3; willing-to-continue, B3; 1>>, 
      <<at l3; perceive, B3, u2; 1>>, 
      <<at l3; understand, B3, U3, P3; 1>> ] 
 Cs (ja de e de ju, , c3) = [s | &  <<at l3; accept, a3, P3; 1>>, 
      <<at l3; believe,  a3, P3; 1>> ] 
 
4.4 Context sensitivity with regard to the preceding communicative act 
 
In this section we will discuss one kind of context sensitivity in relation to the 
formalizations developed so far, namely sensitivity with respect factual polarity . In 
section 3.4.3, we discussed two different analyses of the way in which the factual 
polarity of the preceding utterance influences the content of words like yes and no, 
one based on the notions of acceptance and rejection, one based on the notion of 
commitment to facts. The formalizations suggested here are based on the first 
analysis throughout. 
 
In attribute-value notation, the occurrence content of nä/nej in examples (6) and (7) 
can be represented as (28) and (29), respectively. 
 
 (6) A: de kan ju inte va för fiskarnas skull va 
  (it couldn't be for the sake of the fish you-know) 
 
 B: nä 
  (no) 
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(7) A så går naturen under me tekniken 
  (like that nature perishes with technology) 
 B: NEJ // de växer upp annat då vet du 
  (no //  other things grow up you know) 
 
(28) [INDICATE 
  [CONTACT +] 
  [PERCEPTION +] 
 [UNDERSTANDING +]]  
  [SIGNAL 
  [ATITTUDE 
  [REJECT -]]]  
 
 
(29) [INDICATE 
  [CONTACT +] 
  [PERCEPTION +] 
 [UNDERSTANDING +]]  
  [SIGNAL 
  [ATTITUDE 
  [REJECT +]]]  
 
(28) and (29) differ only in the value they assign to the PATH [SIGNAL [ATTITUDE 
[REJECT]]]. In both cases, the value is the same as the polarity of the preceding 
statement. We can capture this generalization in a set of constraints on the 
attribute-value structure C representing the content of an utterance of the type nej in 
the context of a preceding statement represented by the attribute-value structure PS 
(where the notation f:path designates “the value assigned to path in feature structure 
f”): 
 
(30)  C[INDICATE [CONTACT]]  = + 
 C[INDICATE [PERCEPTION]]  = + 
 C[INDICATE [UNDERSTANDING]]  = + 
 C[SIGNAL [ATTITUDE [REJECT]]]  = PS[POLARITY] 
 
Using situation semantics the contents of nä/nej in examples (6) and (7) can be 
represented as in (3 1) and (32), where, for the first time, we try to give a little 
structure to the contexts. 
 
The context in example (6) is characterized as a situation c6 where it is the case that a 
person A6 addresses B6 at a location l6-1 (temporally preceding the location l6 where 
the feedback utterance occurs), making an utterance 146 with content P6, which has 
the polarity 0. 
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In a similar way, the context of example (7) is characterized as a situation c7 where it 
is the case that a person A7 addresses B7 at a location l7-1 (temporally preceding the 
location l7 where the feedback utterance occurs), making an utterance u7 with content 
P7, which has the polarity 1. 
 
(31) C1 (nej, c6)  = [s  | &  <<at l6; willing-to-continue, B6; 1>>, 
   <<at l6;  perceive, B6, u6; 1>>, 
   <<at l6;  understand, B6, u6, P6; 1>> ] 
 Cs(nej, c6)  = [s  |  &  <<at l6;  reject, B6, P6; 0>> ] 
 
  where c6 | = <<at l6-1; address, A6, B6;  1>> 
  c6 | = <<at l6-1;  utter, A6; u6; 1>> 
  c6 | = <<at l6-1;  content, u6; P6; 1>> 
  c6 | = <<at l6-1;  polarity-of, 0, P6;  1>> 
 
(32) C1 (nej, c7) [s | &  <<at l7;  willing-to-continue, B7; 1 >>, 
   <<at l7;  perceive, B7; u7; 1 >>, 
   <<at l7;  understand, B7; u7; P7; 1 >>  ] 
 Cs (nej, c7) [s | &  <<at l7;   reject, B7;, P7; l>> ] 
 
  where  c7 | = <<at l7-1; address, A7, B7; 1>> 
  c7 | = <<at l7-1; utter, A7, u7; 1 >> 
  c7 | = <<at l7-1; content, u7; P7; 1 >> 
  c7 | = ~<at l7-1;  polarity-of, 1, P7; 
 
1 >> 
 
We can generalize over (31) and (32) by means of parameters and obtain (33), 
which is a characterization of the content of nej in a context of type c. (We use 
boldface for parameters; note especially the polarity parameter I) 
 
(33)  C1 (nej, c) =[s  | &  <<at li; willing-to-continue, B; 1 >>, 
  <<at li; perceive, B, u; 1 >>, 
  <<at li; understand, B, u, P; l >> ] 
 Cs(nej, c) =[ s  | & <<at li; reject, B, P; I>> ] 
 
where c |= <<at li-1; address, A, B; l>> 
 c |= ~<at li-1; utter, A, u; l>> 
 c |= <<at li-1; content, u, P; 1>> 
 c |= <<at li-1; polarity-of, I, P; 1>> 
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Since we have not yet worked out a formalized way of capturing the systematic 
dependency of feedback content on the speech act (mood) and information status of 
the preceding utterance, we will not discuss formalization with regard to these 
features of context sensitivity here. 
 
4.5.  Evocative function 
 
Adding evocative functions to the representations used so far requires nothing new in 
principle. For the attribute-value representations we simply add a complex-valued 
feature EVOCATIVE, which takes as its value feature structures representing 
different evocative functions. For the situation semantic approach we simply extend 
the situation-types representing the content of feedback utterances with more 
conditioning infons corresponding to the evocative aspects of the utterances. 
However, since we have not yet worked out a precise and detailed account of the 
evocative functions we also abstain from giving any formalized examples here. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have argued, discussed and at least partly demonstrated that what 
we have called “the linguistic feedback system” of a language should not be 
regarded as an area of hopeless complexity and confusion. 
 
Rather, linguistic feedback systems seem to be describable subsystems of the 
interactive mechanisms available in the spoken form of any language. We have 
further argued, that such systems not only can be described phonologically, 
morphologically and syntactically, but also semantically and pragmatically. In order 
for such a description to be possible, feedback expressions and feedback mechanisms 
must, just like deictic expressions and deictic mechanisms, be regarded as highly 
context dependent. Specifically, we have argued that an account of the meaning of 
feedback utterances involves considering at least the following dimensions of 
content. 
 
1 . Type of reaction to preceding communicative act. 
2. Communicative status of various aspects of the content conveyed by the 
feedback  utterance. 
3. Context sensitivity with regard to the preceding utterance in at least the 
following respects: 
 
(i) Its evocative function (type of speech act) 
(ii) Its factual polarity 
(iii)  Its information status. 
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4. Evocative status of the feedback utterance. 
 
Our attempts at formalizing these features of the meaning of feedback utterances 
using attribute-value matrices and situation semantics are, naturally, only first 
attempts but, we hope, sufficiently precise as to convince other linguists that the area 
of feedback might be worthy of their attention. 
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